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also often associated with classifications based on culture rather than biology. I will have more to say about the problem of essentialism in ethnic classification later on.
In contrast to racial theories, Western theories of language have proven to be far more significant in the scientific determination of differences between peoples.6 The genealogy of the historical and comparative linguistic approach to classification can be traced to William Jones (1746-94), who discovered in the late eighteenth century that Greek, Latin, Gothic, Celtic, and Sanskrit shared a common origin. During the nineteenth century, a growing number of scholars began to build on Jones's discovery that the basic sounds-what would later be called "phonemes"-used in these languages could be shown to have derived from a common system of sounds.
The recognition that all spoken languages employ a limited set of distinctive contrasts in sound and that these contrastive elements or phonemes are related to each other in a systematic way was, without question, one of the major accomplishments of nineteenth-century science. Although nineteenth-century linguists and their successors also studied the syntax or grammar and semantics of languages, systematic comparisons of phonological systems became the equivalent of genetics in tracing the historical relationships among languages and dialects and for distinguishing languages of one family from another. Such distinctions, backed by the very precise and quantifiable phonological data that could be elicited from informants, subsequently were made a primary basis for distinguishing among peoples. But just as the students of biological differences among humans had made the false assumption that these differences were associated with distinctive behavioral traits, so, too, many have made the untenable assumption that phonological differences are correlated with other cultural differences.
The genetic relationships among phonological systems are, moreover, not the only significant relationships among languages nor are they the best criteria for distinguishing among languages.7 As James A. Matisoff, one of the foremost Asian linguists, has written, "languages which once had no genetic relationship whatsoever may come to appear extremely similar, due to a prolonged period of contact and influence" (1983, 60). Thus, Vietnamese contains a high percentage of vocabulary borrowed from Chinese to which it is genetically unrelated; similarly, in standard Thai a high percentage of words are derived from the genetically unrelated Khmer, and many of these words are, in turn, derived from yet another genetically unrelated language, Sanskrit. What Matisoff is pointing to more generally is that languages, like other cultural traditions more broadly, are products of diverse historical influences, as well as genetic transmissions.
This point finds further support in the fact that many in Asia (as well as in other parts of the world) are bilingual or even multilingual. That is, they share "communicative competence" with peoples whose native languages may be very different (Gumperz and Hymes 1972, vii). Matisoff, speaking of lingua francae that serve to facilitate relationships among peoples who speak different languages, observes: "The fact that a language comes to be used as a lingua franca by large numbers of non-native speakers ... is due ... to the accidents of political and cultural history" 6Buxton observed in the introduction to his book that an alternative for classifying human difference to the method that he employed, which, he noted, "is not dissimilar in principle to that used by many morphologists for classifying other animals," is "one is based on language that is predicated on the rapid advances made at the beginning of the last [nineteenth] century by the comparative philologists" (1925, 4).
7I follow historical linguists in using "genetic" for the connections among phonological systems, although these connections are clearly not genetic in a biological sense. (1983, 58) . Despite these problems in employing the assumption that language differences are invariable indicators of cultural difference, it has in fact become central to most approaches to ethnic classification.
Support for historical/comparative linguistics in identifying fundamental cultural differences that are transmitted in a genetic-like way from one generation to another also came from the nineteenth century from a new science, that of ethnology.8 The adoption of the root ethn-from the ancient Greek word ethnos (people) for use in a systematic study of human differences appears to have first occurred in Germany in the late eighteenth century (Pels and Salemink 1999a, 23).9 By the 1830s the term ethnography, borrowed from German (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., "ethnography") had been introduced into English and became the basis for the founding of British ethnology (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., "ethnology"). Although both British and continental ethnologists gave increasing attention during the nineteenth century to the cultural manifestations of human differences, they continued to link these to biological differences. The preferred term of nineteenth-century ethnologists for different human types was race. This is not the place to provide a detailed account of the emergence of an ethnology (or ethnologies) that fostered the projects of the scientific classification of peoples into ethnic groups. I wish here to focus on only two strands in this genealogical inquiry.
One strand begins with the work of the American Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-81). Morgan's research on kinship established that systems of kin terms were fundamental to human society in a way comparable to the relationship of phonological systems to language. He went beyond this, however, in his book Ancient Society ([1878] 1985) , to propose that all human societies could be classified on the basis of their social structures (family and government), economies (subsistence and property), and cultures (language and religion), as belonging to one of three evolutionary stagessavagery, barbarism, and civilization.
Morgan's approach was deeply influential on Karl Marx and, even more, on Friedrich Engels. Marx's notes on Ancient Society were used after Marx's death by Engels for his Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, in the Light of the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan (German original 1884; English translation 1972). Engels reformulated Morgan's theory in light of, in his terms, "the materialistic conception, the determining factor in history [that] is, the production and reproduction of the immediate essentials of life."'0 Engels's historical-materialist version of Morgan's ideas subsequently were reworked by V. I. Lenin and Josef Stalin for the science of ethnology 8I use "ethnology" instead of "anthropology" because anthropology can also mean the study of physical differences. I take ethnology to subsume theoretical commonalities between continental European ethnology, British social anthropology, and American cultural anthropology.
9Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink point out that because histories of anthropology typically begin with the emergence of a discipline, earlier work that was ethnographic tends to be ignored that was later adopted in all countries led by a communist party. Particularly noteworthy for our purposes is Stalin's widely used definition of a nation as "an historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (Stalin 1953, 307).1 As Walker Connor notes, the "nation" in early Marxist-Leninist thought "was explained as a historically evolved phenomenon that comes into existence only with the demise of feudalism and the rise of capitalism" (1984, 7). Marxist ethnologists, however, subsequently used Stalin's definition to differentiate between subnational groups that were-following the evolutionary scheme derived by Engels from Morgan-far from having reached the capitalist stage.
The second strand I will follow here is one found in non-Marxist Anglo-American anthropology. Until World War II, Anglo-American anthropologists focused their attention on peoples belonging to Morgan's categories of "savagery" and "barbarism," although the preferred term for such peoples came to be "tribe." In a 1912 version of the influential handbook for anthropological research published by the Royal Anthropological Institute, the definition of "tribe" appears rather similar to Stalin's definition of "nation." A tribe is "a group of a simple kind, nomadic or settled in a more or less definite locality, speaking a common dialect, with a rude form of government, and capable of uniting for common action, as in warfare" (Freire-Marreco and Myres 1912, 156). Although they used different terms for the peoples they studied, there was a consensus prior to World War II among all ethnologists and anthropologists, Marxist and non-Marxist, that there were fundamental social structural, cultural, and economic differences among peoples that remained the same from one generation to the next and, thus, made it possible to produce scientifically precise classifications of different peoples.
Most ethnological and anthropological work undertaken in the pre-World War II period was in territories under European, American, or Japanese colonial rule or among Native Americans in the United States. The war, however, brought a major change in Western, and especially American, anthropology. It had prompted efforts in the United States to compile as detailed information as possible on the different peoples living in the areas, mainly in Asia, where American troops were fighting. These efforts led to the founding of the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) in which systematic information from all possible sources was compiled on the different cultures of the world.
By the 1950s, American anthropologists began to use the term "ethnic group" instead of the older terms.'2 The choice was made partially in reaction against the older evolutionary approach and partially because of a growing recognition of many different types of groups other than "tribes" as originally conceived assumptions which underlay them were being challenged increasingly in Western anthropology.
The challenge to Anglo-American anthropology can be said to have begun with the publication in 1954 of E. R. Leach's Political Systems of Highland Burma. Leach had set out before World War II to study a "tribe"-the Kachin-living in upper Burma based on fieldwork in what he thought was a representative community of this tribe. His research was reoriented, however, when during the war he traveled as a British officer widely throughout the Kachin hills. He came to realize that the Kachin, contrary to "the ordinary ethnographic conventions" he had learned before the war, were not a people with a single language, a common social structure, and an unchanging political system (1954, 281). Rather, the Kachin included speakers of several distinct languages (Jingpaw, Maru, Nung, and Lisu), had a social structure that oscillated between two different types through time, and were organized politically in relationship to another quite different people, the Shan. In other words, the Kachin did not fit the classical model of a "tribe" or that of an ethnic group being a "culture-bearing unit."13 Leach's interpretation of the Kachin as a product of political relationships with other distinctive peoples foreshadowed the development of theories of ethnicity that emphasize the interactions between peoples rather than their essential differences. Leach himself only hinted in his study that colonial domination and Christian missionization were beginning to transform fundamentally the political relationships of the Kachin. His approach laid the groundwork, nonetheless, for understanding why the Kachin are, seemingly paradoxically, a significant ethnic group in contemporary Burma.
This conundrum can be understood in light of post-1960s theoretical work on the study of ethnicity. Since all humans acquire linguistic and the cultural habitswhat Pierre Bourdieu (1977) has termed habitusl4-that make it possible for them to act in the world before they are conscious of doing so, such habits can seem to be essential to their very being (see Abu-Lughod 1991, 144; Hastrup and Olwig 1997, 11; Tapp 2002, 64). Whether or not some or all of these patterns are in fact taken as primordial (see Geertz 1963; Keyes 1976) or whether other patterns-such as another language or new occupational skills or acquired social status-will supersede the earliest learned patterns, depends, however, on the situations in which people act (Keyes 1981) . The social recognition of significant differences among peoples depends, moreover, not only on the patterns that previously have been acquired but also on which patterns become salient in relationships between peoples who see themselves or are seen by others as being different.
In the modern world, nation-states have assumed preeminent roles not only in structuring the situations in which social relationships take place but more significantly in determining what differences are significant for the peoples living 13In his 1954 work, Leach did not use the term "ethnic group," but he makes clear in a comment on a paper by Raoul Naroll (1964; Leach's comments included with the article) that he drew on his Kachin research to challenge a conception of "ethnic group" that preserved the same features as "tribe."
'4Bourdieu introduces the concept of habitus for the "dispositions" that lead people to act in ways that reproduce the world as it is lived in (1977, 72, 78, 82) . The habitus leads to the production of a common sense world (Bourdieu 1977, 80) ; that is, the world, although constructed, is naturalized (164). The habitus, becoming naturalized, generates a hierarchy of relations, a mode of domination. Since the habitus is unconscious, this domination goes unrecognized, or, in Bourdieu's terms, "misrecognized" (meconnaissance) (5, 21-22, 97, 133, 172-83). under their jurisdiction. As I have written elsewhere: "Modern states or movements seeking to capture state power have sought to promote ('invent') dominant narratives about the cultural heritage and the destiny of those claimed to constitute a national community. Nationalist discourses have created an environment in which ethnicity has flourished" (Keyes 1997b, 153) . The Kachin, to return to our example, are an ethnic group in Burma today because of the politics of ethnicity in that country (Smith 1991).
While biological, linguistic, and ethnological sciences can generate significant work about the differences among human beings, they cannot determine the differences between "peoples" or "ethnic groups." Such determination, as I will now attempt to show, has been a product of politics, especially the politics of modern nation-states.
Civilized Peoples and Peoples of the Frontiers
The politics of ethnic classification that began in the colonial era were predicated on assumptions about territoriality and human differences that were different fundamentally from those held in Asia in the precolonial period. In the precolonial era, the empires in mainland Southeast Asia and China were separated primarily by frontiers rather than borders.15 In the precolonial era, fundamental differences among peoples were primarily matters of either Sinitic or Buddhist civilization,16 locality and kinship, not biology or even spoken language.
From Han times on, the rulers of the Middle Kingdom recognized no borders. Rather, those who lived on the frontiers of the empire were considered to be barbarians (man) who had not yet been civilized; that is, they had not yet accepted the order presided over by the emperor or the authority of a literature written in Chinese. Expansion into frontier areas was justified, and continues to be justified, in Chinese historical writing "as actions of a benevolent emperor/state acting justly with divine endorsement, to preserve order" (Wade 2000, 43).17 The barbarians were to be transformed-that is drawn "into the fold" (guihua)-through education (jiaohua) or royal power (wanghua). "Those who remain beyond the pale of civilisation are 'outside of the transformed realm' (huawai)" (Fiskesj6 1999, 140). "Barbarians" were divided further into those who were "raw" (sheng) or "cooked" ( (1987) has shown in the case of British Malaya, the census became a primary tool for reifying systems of classification of cultural differences among the populations in the colonial territories. In British Burma and Malaya, the fundamental distinctions were labeled "races," although the term was based more on cultural than physical differences. For example, the 1931 census in Burma categorized peoples into the racial types of "indigenous," Indian, Chinese, Indo-Burmese (that is, of mixed Indian and Burmese descent), and other (Furnivall 1948, 118) .
A similar use of "racial" distinctions was also employed, although to a lesser extent, in French Indochina. David Streckfuss has identified an article, "Les Races de l'Indochine" by A. T. Mondiere published in 1882 and (as a continuation) in 1883, as the first effort to advocate for the use of anthropology for the colonial enterprise (1993, 127). His "races" were based not on physiological differences but on linguistic and cultural characteristics. The term race appears, as Streckfuss notes, to have been used by the French, and I think the same was true for the British, to designate "groups that had reached a certain level of'civilization"' (128).
The aforementioned British Burma census of 1931 indicates a distinction between races that increasingly became significant during the colonial period-namely a distinction between indigenous and migrant peoples. This policy was predicated on a vision of a "Thai nation" (chat Thai) that entailed a very different assumption about the relationship of peoples within the boundaries of the Thai state than that which had previously been held under the Siamese empire. The term chat is derived from the Sanskrit/Pali term jdti, "that which is given at birth." Until modern times, and still today in some contexts, chat is understood to mean a "life" in a succession of lives. The modern meaning, introduced by the court elite from the late nineteenth century on, is, however, that of a people who share a common heritage from the past.
The heritage of the chat Thai was conceived as so broad as to make possible the inclusion of most peoples living within the newly drawn boundaries of the country. First, all peoples speaking related but mutually unintelligible languages belonging to the Tai language family were by administrative fiat construed as sharing a common language. Second, all those who followed Buddhist traditions-even though the several traditions were different and even though adherents might speak non-Tai languages-were considered to share a common religion. These two premises made it possible to claim in the early twentieth century that at least 85 percent of the population were members of the Thai nation. Differences within the nation were then construed as regional rather than ethnic. Thus, people who might have been recognized, following Western theories, as ethnically Lao were instead construed as being northeasterners or northerners (see Keyes 1967) . The use of regional rather than ethnic criteria for recognizing differences also obscured some significant differences. Thus, speakers of Khmer and Khmer-related languages living in northeastern Thailand were rendered invisible, and speakers of Malay who also followed Islam became a type of "southern Thai." Although some indigenous peoples resisted "national integration" in the first decades of the twentieth century, the implementation by the 1930s of a compulsory system of primary education which used a standardized form of educated central Thai language as a medium of instruction and from which students learned the history of the nation in which differences were minimized, the vast majority of the people in the county began to think of themselves as being members of a Thai nation, no matter what domestic language they spoke or what local traditions they followed.
The 
China30
In the 1950s, the new communist-led government gave Chinese scholars the mandate to carry out a systematic scientific classification of the diverse peoples (minzu) within the country. The results of the project, summarized in the following tables, appear to give a precise accounting of the significant cultural differences within the borders of China. But this precision, purportedly based on good scientific research, is in fact the product of particular politics of cultural difference.
The project of ethnic classification that took place in China in the 1950s has its roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After 1911 the new revolutionary government at first perpetuated a late Qing perspective that the most significant peoples within the empire were Han, Manchu, Mongols, Xinjiang Muslims, and Tibetans (Crossley 1990, 835; Mackerras 1995, 44-45). These five groups were represented on the new revolutionary flag (Eberhard 1982, 151) . This older classification of the peoples of China, however, did not remain in place for long.
A major change in thinking about human differences was introduced into China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by Chinese who were influenced directly (as students in Japan) or indirectly (through reading Japanese works) by 28See below for discussion of this research. 29The term chatiphan is an academic neologism that has been used only since the 1970s. 30I am indebted to Cheung Siu-woo of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology for his assistance in obtaining material concerning the history of Chinese classification of minority peoples. will not undertake a detailed review here, particularly as some of the same issues that emerge from the Chinese case are also associated with the much less well-studied Vietnamese case. I wish here to note only a few salient aspects that resulted from the project. First, the minzu shibie project was undertaken on the premise that scientific theories and theoretically informed research would make it possible, in Thomas S. Mullaney's words, to determine "the precise make-up of the nation" (2002, 2, emphasis added). Second, in contrast to the premodern distinction between the civilized Han and the barbarians or the Qing and early Republican recognition of the five major "races" of China, the minzu shibie project equated all minority peoples by designating all of them as minzu. As Frank Dikotter has observed, a conference held in 1962 determined to use the term minzu in all cases, "thereby ascribing a political status to all the minorities, whatever their stage of development" (1992, 109 n. 41). Third, and related to this, the Chinese departed from the Soviet prototype in not recognizing differences between two levels of difference, which in Russian are indicated by the terms narod and narodnost. In other words, none of the peoples of China would be construed as a people who could make claims to separate nationhood. All minzu were considered to be integral components of the nation of China (Zhongguo). Finally, the minzu shibie project resulted in the creation of ethnic groups out of the much more variegated cultural mosaic of China. Over four hundred potential groups identified on the basis of local distinctions were reduced to the officially recognized fifty-six minzu. Table 3 .) The Vietnamese Communist Party, however, has departed from its Soviet mentor in its application of these principles. Although strong similarities can be identified between the politics of diversity in Vietnam and China, the implementation of minority policies has also had different consequences.
Key to understanding postcolonial Vietnamese policies toward the diverse peoples living within the boundaries of the country is the concept of dan toc, a term that is cognate with the Chinese minzu. The term dan toc can mean "the nation," but its more usual meaning is to designate the diverse peoples or ethnic groups who make up the Vietnamese nation (Dang Nghiem Van 1998, 13 n.). When used in the second sense, the term is often subsumed in the phrase dcn toc thieu so "ethnic minorities."
The To ethnology, an important branch of the social sciences, the task falls of studying the formation and development of ethnic groups and the characteristics of their material and cultural life in order to bring out their best traditions, reveal the backward survivals so as to liquidate them step by step, contribute to the reformation and promotion of ethnic societies, strengthen solidarity between ethnic groups as well as national pride.
(1972, 9-10)
With such a guiding principle in mind, the ethnologists of Vietnam set out to produce a "scientific" classification of the dan t&o in Vietnam. A dan toc was defined, following Stalin, as being "[a] stable community, formed over a historical period, involving relationships of identity in regard to language, habitat range, socioeconomic activities, cultural characteristics-a community whose members are conscious of their shared ethnic identity, on the basis of the foregoing relations" (Dang Nghiem Van 1998, 14) . Although ethnic self-consciousness appears to be the ultimate criterion for determining ethnic divisions between local groups, those who undertook the classification of dan t6c found "self identity" too subjective to be adequate for a "scientific classification." Nguyen Van Thang, a Vietnamese ethnologist, observes in his recently completed dissertation in anthropology at the University of Washington that "in practice, the ethnic consciousness of members of ethnic groups was not fully respected. In cases where there were disagreements between the self-definition and the definition made by ethnologists, the ethnologists were instructed to use 'scientific data' collected among people or elicited from historical records to explain to the people in question who they were" (2001, 137). He goes on to describe that what actually were taken as "scientific data" were "observable cultural traditions," such as language, residential patterns, and ritual activities. When there were disagreements between local groups and the researchers regarding the identity of a people, an identity was "imposed" on the group.37
As in China, this classification had the effect of officially reducing diversity in the country because many local groups were compelled to accept an imposed identity that was different from that which they used for themselves. The classification also had the consequence of officially fixing diversity. But, as we shall see, the classification of dan toc has not proven to be the final answer about who are the Vietnamese peoples.
Border-crossing Peoples and Peoples across Borders
The projects of classification of the peoples within the borders of Vietnam, Thailand, and China would seem, because of the scientific premises on which they have been based, to have resulted in a precise fixing of who these peoples are. But these projects have generated a new problem of ethnic classification that undermines the premises on which they are based. Some peoples in the ethnic system of one country see themselves and are recognized as belonging to border-crossing communities. Officially sanctioned pluralism has not eliminated older ideas of hierarchy that find expression in prejudices shaping everyday encounters between peoples who see each other as fundamentally different because of the persistence of old stereotypes.49 Moreover, some peoples living within the boundaries of these countries cannot make claims to belonging to the nation of the country in which they reside. Some are expatriates who are temporarily employed with foreign businesses, while others-like the hundreds of thousands of people from Burma living on the western border of Thailand-officialy are considered illegal migrants. And some, especially in China (for example, Tibetans, Uygurs, and others) reject the national identity of the country in which they are legally citizens. For our purposes, however, what is significant is that Chinese-ness, Vietnamese-ness, and Thai-ness as national identities can be claimed by peoples with diverse cultural and linguistic heritages.
